Intel SSD 520 / Samsung 840 EVO hardware encryption secure?
Posted: January 14th, 2014, 19:22
Hi,
I have been reading up on available information regarding the hardware encrytion available for both the Intel SSD 520 and the Samsung 840 EVO. I must say details are sparse, but I am trying to evaluate if the hardware encryption offered by these SSDs are more/less secure than software FDE like LUKS/Truecrypt. My intention is not to start a discussion on software FDE, but instead focus on the hardware solution.
What I know till now is that both drives encrypt information by default using AES and that the key is stored in the embedded controller. Without a ATA password this encryption is transparant to the user. According to the following blog if an ATA password is set, it will be used to hash the AES key:
http://vxlabs.com/2012/12/22/ssds-with- ... ncryption/
What I don't know if what hashing algorithm is being used, how many rounds of hashing are applied and most importantly if this information is also stored outside the SSD controller. I know this may vary from vendor to vendor, but any more information is welcome.
I have also been also reading some posts on this forum about ATA passwords. From what I understand these passwords are actually being stored on special areas of the disc in a proprietary vendor specific format. This is not part of the ATA specs, but actually a vendor specific extension and special commands or modes are commonly used to set this information. However, I am not sure how much of this still applies to a modern SSD that uses full disc encryption? Is it still possible to access this information using MHDD? Is the ATA password indeed still stored in obfuscated or hashed format somewhere on the disc? Would an offline brute force attack be feasible in case of hashed passwords? I know this is dependant on the length of the ATA password, but also depends on the used hashing algorithm and the rounds of hashing.
Last but not least there is also the NSA ANT catalog, which was recently released and it a sort of internal shopping list. It shows what the NSA was already capable of in 2007. One of the items also involves disc firmware modification:
http://engineeringevil.files.wordpress. ... -19-55.jpg
This brings me to my last question. Is it still possible to update firmware on SSDs that have an ATA password set? If yes, this seems like a perfect way to perform an evil maid type of attack on the hardware FDE.
I know there are a lot of questions in this post, but I hope some of you will be able to shed some light on some of the topics or guide me into the right direction to do further research.
I have been reading up on available information regarding the hardware encrytion available for both the Intel SSD 520 and the Samsung 840 EVO. I must say details are sparse, but I am trying to evaluate if the hardware encryption offered by these SSDs are more/less secure than software FDE like LUKS/Truecrypt. My intention is not to start a discussion on software FDE, but instead focus on the hardware solution.
What I know till now is that both drives encrypt information by default using AES and that the key is stored in the embedded controller. Without a ATA password this encryption is transparant to the user. According to the following blog if an ATA password is set, it will be used to hash the AES key:
http://vxlabs.com/2012/12/22/ssds-with- ... ncryption/
What I don't know if what hashing algorithm is being used, how many rounds of hashing are applied and most importantly if this information is also stored outside the SSD controller. I know this may vary from vendor to vendor, but any more information is welcome.
I have also been also reading some posts on this forum about ATA passwords. From what I understand these passwords are actually being stored on special areas of the disc in a proprietary vendor specific format. This is not part of the ATA specs, but actually a vendor specific extension and special commands or modes are commonly used to set this information. However, I am not sure how much of this still applies to a modern SSD that uses full disc encryption? Is it still possible to access this information using MHDD? Is the ATA password indeed still stored in obfuscated or hashed format somewhere on the disc? Would an offline brute force attack be feasible in case of hashed passwords? I know this is dependant on the length of the ATA password, but also depends on the used hashing algorithm and the rounds of hashing.
Last but not least there is also the NSA ANT catalog, which was recently released and it a sort of internal shopping list. It shows what the NSA was already capable of in 2007. One of the items also involves disc firmware modification:
http://engineeringevil.files.wordpress. ... -19-55.jpg
This brings me to my last question. Is it still possible to update firmware on SSDs that have an ATA password set? If yes, this seems like a perfect way to perform an evil maid type of attack on the hardware FDE.
I know there are a lot of questions in this post, but I hope some of you will be able to shed some light on some of the topics or guide me into the right direction to do further research.