Analysis of Dell FW update for SK hynix SC300 SSD (SH87810AA controller)Here is a firmware update for an SC300 SSD based on an SK Hynix SH87810AA controller, probably a rebranded LAMD controller.
SK Hynix SC300 M.2 Solid State Drive Firmware Update:
https://www.dell.com/support/home/en-au/drivers/driversdetails?driverid=754y5https://dl.dell.com/FOLDER04141057M/2/SK%20Hynix%20SC300%20M.2%20Solid%20State%20Drive%20Firmware%20Update_ZPE.exe"This package provides the firmware for SK Hynix SC300 M.2 2280 128GB/256GB/512GB, Revision 20101P00 ..."
I extracted the firmware payload file, 20101P00.ALL.bin. It consists of 36-byte records. The first 32 bytes are data while the last 4 bytes appear to be some kind of checksum or ECC. Can anyone identify the ECC/checksum algorithm?
Code:
Offset(h) 00 04 08 0C 10 14 18 1C 20
00000000 CEFAFECA 31050135 60EC1A00 05000000 32303130 31503030 3C9A0600 01000000 38936205 ÎúþÊ1..5`ì......20101P00<š......8“b.
00000024 0C000000 08000000 76000000 040201AD EE14A742 60010000 30323031 50313030 46086B06 ........v.......î.§B`...0201P100F.k.
00000048 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 01000000 0C000000 3DF60701 ................................=ö..
0000006C 08000000 76000000 040202AD 5A15A744 605F0500 30323031 50313030 00000000 5C328302 ....v.......Z.§D`_..0201P100....\2ƒ.
00000090 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 01000000 0C000000 08000000 2A388803 ................................*8ˆ.
000000B4 76000000 040201AD 5A14AB42 60BD0A00 30323031 50313030 00000000 00000000 28DFAE02 v.......Z.«B`½..0201P100........(ß®.
000000D8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 01000000 0C000000 08000000 76000000 ADACE700 ............................v.....
000000FC 040202AD 5C15AB44 601D1000 30323031 50313030 00000000 00000000 00000000 BAB6B700 ....\.«D`...0201P100............º¶·.
00000120 00000000 00000000 00000000 01000000 0C000000 08000000 76000000 040204AD 0D834707 ........................v........ƒG.
00000144 5E16AB46 607F1500 30323031 50313030 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 63F1B902 ^.«F`...0201P100................cñ¹.
00000168 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ....................................
0000018C 4453534C 4D524148 607C0000 2E44724A D47B0000 80000000 D47B0000 8FB54A77 7E47CF06 DSSLMRAH`|...DrJÔ{..€...Ô{...µJw~GÏ.
000001B0 44010000 607C0000 44010000 8746E3A4 C8B90000 C07D0000 C8B90000 A989C1B3 4FF0F000 D...`|..D...‡Fã¤È¹..À}..ȹ..©‰Á³Oðð.
000001D4 BCBA0000 A0370100 BCBA0000 9624BC0A 08820100 60F20100 08820100 20EDBAF7 80EF4602 ¼º.. 7..¼º..–$¼..‚..`ò...‚.. íº÷€ïF.
^^^^^^^^
checksum
The structure is most evident in text records.
Code:
Offset(h) 00 04 08 0C 10 14 18 1C 20
000C0138 20666561 74757265 200A0025 2D387320 3A205B63 685D205B 6469655D 205B626C 005E1800 feature ..%-8s : [ch] [die] [bl.^..
000C015C 6F636B5D 20777269 74652061 20646566 65637420 6D61726B 20287573 6520666F 927A5B06 ock] write a defect mark (use fo’z[.
000C0180 72206D2D 6C697374 290A0025 2D387320 3C616464 723E3A20 72656164 20726567 1DEC4607 r m-list)..%-8s <addr>: read reg.ìF.
000C01A4 69737465 72206174 20676976 656E2061 64647265 73732868 65782066 6F726D61 4E35BF03 ister at given address(hex formaN5¿.
000C01C8 74292E0A 00252D38 73203C61 6464723E 203C7661 6C3E3A20 77726974 65207265 76230405 t)...%-8s <addr> <val>: write rev#..
000C01EC 67697374 65722061 74206769 76656E20 61646472 65737328 68657829 20776974 EBC2D205 gister at given address(hex) witëÂÒ.
000C0210 68206769 76656E20 76616C28 68657829 2E0A0025 2D387320 3A207377 69746368 D628D302 h given val(hex)...%-8s : switchÖ(Ó.
000C0234 20554152 5420746F 20686F73 74204152 4D2E0A00 252D3873 203C6275 663E3C64 F7FC0402 UART to host ARM...%-8s <buf><d֟..
000C0258 6174613E 3C6E6279 74653E3A 2066696C 6C204275 66666572 20776974 68206461 911A5D06 ata><nbyte>: fill Buffer with da‘.].
^^^^^^^^
checksum
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